

The work-from-home revolution and the performance of cities

Authors:

Steven Bond-Smith^x

University of Hawai'i

Philip McCann^y

The University of Manchester

Date:

September 2022

The Productivity Institute

Working Paper No.026

*University of Hawai'i Economic Research Organization

‡Alliance Manchester Business School and The Productivity Institute

Key words

Working-from-home, agglomeration economies

JEL codes:

R1

Authors' contacts:

bondsmit@hawaii.edu; Philip.McCann@manchester.ac.uk

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Tony Venables and Bart van Ark for many helpful comments and suggestions.

Copyright

© S. Bond-Smith, P. McCann (2022)

Suggested citation

S. Bond-Smith, P. McCann (2022) *The work-from-home revolution and the performance of cities*. Working Paper No. 026, The Productivity Institute.

The Productivity Institute is an organisation that works across academia, business and policy to better understand, measure and enable productivity across the UK. It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/V002740/1).

The Productivity Institute, headquartered at Alliance Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, Booth Street West, Manchester, M15 6PB. More information can be found on [The Productivity Institute's website](#). Contact us at theproductivityinstitute@manchester.ac.uk

Abstract

In this paper we set out the relationships between the behavioural, technological and spatial changes in systems that allow for heterogeneous responses to working-from-home by different types of actors, and also identifies the channels via which such changes take place. Unlike all other papers on the subject, the analytical framework we propose centers explicitly on the role of frequency of commuting.

In particular, we find that the optimal frequency of commuting is positively related to the opportunity costs of less-than-continuous face-to-face interaction and inversely related to the travel plus travel-time costs. The results also support recent empirical findings of a “donut effect” with greater growth in the suburbs and hinterlands around large cities, but also capture inter-city effects for the first time. Counterintuitively, the reduction in the frequency of commuting makes larger cities and their hinterlands more desirable places, in spite of longer commuting distances. Taken together, our results imply enhanced productivity of larger cities over smaller cities.

The work-from-home revolution and the performance of cities

Steven Bond-Smith* and Philip McCann⁺

5 October 2022

Abstract

In this paper we set out the relationships between the behavioural, technological and spatial changes in systems that allow for heterogeneous responses to working-from-home by different types of actors, and also identifies the channels via which such changes take place. Unlike all other papers on the subject, the analytical framework we propose centers explicitly on the role of frequency of commuting. In particular, we find that the optimal frequency of commuting is positively related to the opportunity costs of less-than-continuous face-to-face interaction and inversely related to the travel plus travel-time costs. The results also support recent empirical findings of a “donut effect” with greater growth in the suburbs and hinterlands around large cities, but also capture inter-city effects for the first time. Counterintuitively, the reduction in the frequency of commuting makes larger cities and their hinterlands more desirable places, in spite of longer commuting distances. Taken together, our results imply enhanced productivity of larger cities over smaller cities.

JEL classifications: R1

Keywords: Working-from-home, agglomeration economies

1 Introduction

The onset of Covid-19 and the associated rise of working from home has the potential to fundamentally reshape interaction with workplaces, commuting patterns, and the economic geography of cities and regions. Technological advances and behavioural changes allow for changes in the frequency with which workers commute to their workplaces versus working from home. Many different pieces of evidence posit changes to different aspects of these relationships, but there is no consensus on their long-term implications. Indeed, as the world emerges from the covid economy to something ‘normal’, distinguishing what is temporary and transitory from what is fundamental still remains complex.

In this paper we examine the effects of the work-from-home (WFH) and hybrid work revolution on the spatial structures and performance of cities. In order to do this, we

*University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, University of Hawai‘i Economic Research Organization (UHERO); Saunders Hall 507, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96822, United States. E-mail address: bondsmi@hawaii.edu.

⁺University of Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business School, Manchester, United Kingdom, and The Productivity Institute, Manchester, United Kingdom.

We are grateful to Tony Venables and Bart van Ark for many helpful comments and suggestions.

first examine the various pieces of evidence currently available which describe the types of changes that cities are facing in response to the WFH revolution. We then outline the types of conceptual issues which these observations give rise to, and in particular, we emphasise the centrality which the choice of commuting frequency plays in determining how cities adjust in response to the WFH revolution. Existing papers do not address this issue, and to also demonstrate the centrality of this point analytically, we outline a very simple model which explains how the choice of optimal commuting frequency is related to spatial and behavioural features of the firm, its workers, and the city. This then allows us to develop a full urban model which investigates how the variable commuting frequency possibilities afforded by the WFH revolution shape the city. The changes in the frequency of interactions and the ways in which they endogenously influence all other variables, combine to enhance the productivity advantages of larger cities over smaller cities, an observation which as yet has not been generally understood.

2 The work-from-home (WFH) revolution and economic geography

Prior to the Covid-19 crisis, for many workers across the globe, working from home was only ever a marginal aspect of their work practices, if at all. Both between firms and within firms and organisations, most important discussions on most topics took place in person. Contract and sales negotiations, personnel training and mentoring activities, as well as hiring, promotion (Emanuel and Harrington, 2021) and human resource activities, were almost all entirely based on face-to-face (FTF) interactions. Indeed, beyond individual firm boundaries, face-to-face interactions are essential also for generating and transmitting the tacit knowledge which is central to driving agglomeration spillovers as well as many aspects of entrepreneurship and innovation-related activities. The result was that prior to the covid-19 lockdown experience, working from home and working at the workplace (WAW) were only slightly imperfect substitutes for each other (de Graaff and Rietveld, 2007), and although teleworking from home extended overall working hours (de Graaff and Rietveld, 2004) it only ever played a small role in shaping overall working practices (de Graaff and Rietveld, 2007). Prior to the covid-19 lockdown, less than 5% of UK workers primarily worked from home (Felstead and Feuschke, 2020).

The onset of the covid-19 pandemic fundamentally changed this situation. Working from home suddenly became a central feature of the working routines of hundreds of millions of workers, with a rapid rise in the use of technologies facilitating online meetings such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, GoogleMeet, Cisco Webex, Skype-for-Business and others, a phenomenon which has been labelled collectively as the ‘zoomshock’ (Fraja et al., 2021). The rapid ‘zoomshock’ learning which societies have undergone in the last few years have changed how both individual workers and organisations consider their employment roles. Widespread evidence (Dingel and Neiman, 2020) suggests that the pandemic-induced WFH tele-working possibilities favoured higher skills and higher income groups, especially in high value service industries, and those in managerial, professional or financial occupations, relative to all other skills and income groups (Bloom, 2020; Sostero et al., 2020). As such, these are the occupational groups who were most able to take advantage of these technologies and to learn how best to work-from-home (WFH), both during the lockdowns but also potentially after the lockdowns have finally ended. The likely persistence of these hybrid working practices (Bloom, 2022) which allows for a greater role of WFH, arises both from the fact that firms

and individuals have learned how to better adapt to the new technologies (Bartik et al., 2020), as well as the fact that reduced commuting offers professional and personal benefits (Haldane, 2020; Bruce-Lockhart et al., 2021) including enhanced personal wellbeing (JLL, 2020) and the management of lifestyle choices (Sawhill and Katherine, 2020; Bangham and Gustafsson, 2020).

The pandemic experience has helped people to better distinguish between how important and necessary FTF interactions are versus online WFH interactions in different circumstances and with regard to different issues. In particular, people and organisations have learned new modes of working and have discovered that many, but not all, activities, can be done remotely, with no need for face-to-face interaction. On the other hand, evidence has emerged that virtual meetings inhibit innovation compared to FTF interactions (Brucks and Levay, 2022), and the reduced interpersonal communication opportunities associated with WFH also reduces productivity for many higher skilled employees (Gibbs et al., 2022). As such, across workers there are likely to be a continuum of outcomes. Some workers and firms will conclude that given the nature of their occupations and roles, that their work will continue to be completely in-person and reliant on continuous FTF interactions at the workplace with zero WFH possibilities. Based on a combination of their types of work roles and well as their personal preferences, Bloom (2020) estimates that this group will account for some 30% of the workforce. In other cases, firms and workers will conclude that given a person’s occupation and activities, a shift to permanent WFH with zero FTF interactions at the workplace, is sensible for some workers, and again Bloom (2020) estimates that this group accounts for approximately one third of workers. At the same time, the cost-saving from off-shoring fully-remote work could also be substantial (Brinatti et al., 2021). Finally, the remaining 40% of workers will deploy hybrid working practices which mix FTF with WFH (Bloom, 2020). Taken together, the post-pandemic home-working shares for white-collar workers are predicted on average account for at least 20% of total working time more than the pre-pandemic WFH shares, whereas for blue-collar and lower skills workers this share is likely to be no more than 10% (Barrero et al., 2020). This is expected to lead to average of 1.5 days per week WFH, although there are large differences between countries (Aksoy et al., 2022) and different types of industries and firms.

Each of these issues raises the question of how activities and working practices have changed in response to the pandemic-induced ‘zoomshock’. At the same time, however, a crucial point of these zoomshock changes is also that they also inherently raise the question of where these activities and practices take place. The zoomshock-induced hybrid working opportunities involving some WFH practices have inherently forced individual workers and organisations to reconsider the nature of their spatial relationships, in the sense of reconsidering where they live, where they work, and how often they commute so as to interact via in-person face-to-face (FTF) contact relative to remote interaction via WFH-based telecommuting. These spatial reconsiderations force people to re-assess the efficiency and effectiveness of commuting behaviour and to adjust their working practices to better fit the commercial, organisational and personal opportunities associated with online working.

There has already been some US evidence that the increase in WFH and hybrid working practices during the pandemic lockdowns encouraged the growth of suburban real estate markets relative to city centre markets (Gupta et al., 2021), leading to a so-called ‘donut’ effect (Ramani and Bloom, 2021). There is also already strong real estate pricing evidence of such spread effects taking place within and around cities (The Economist, 2021; Ramani and Bloom, 2021; Mackenzie, 2021) although whether this results primarily in higher sub-urban real estate prices or greater local residential expansion depends on how responsive the land

use planning system is to these residential shifts (Cheshire et al., 2021). Yet, the spatial effects of these hybrid and WFH changes are still not entirely clear. More recently the picture appears to be more nuanced, in that while the ‘donut’ effect is indeed observed in many US cities, in other cities, the downtown and city centre areas are holding up relatively well in comparison to suburbs, and this is particular the case in economically weaker cities of the US (Chun et al., 2022), giving a rather mixed picture (Lee and Huang, 2022). In addition, beyond increased suburbanisation, there is also some evidence of population movements away from the largest cities to smaller centres (Frey, 2022), with lockdown-related employment spread effects occurring in other second tier cities (Muro and You, 2021), although these effects may be rather limited.¹

Yet, it is also unclear the extent to which these US observations are also replicated in other parts of the world. In particular, many OECD countries in Europe and East Asia have population densities which are much greater than the US, and with cities which are much more closely located near each other than is the case in North America. In addition, many of these countries have strict land use planning regimes, thereby limiting housing supply responses. In these cases, it is not obvious that ‘donut’ effects will necessarily be the primary response to the zoomshock, especially as the effects of the pandemic recede. Indeed, in the UK, the evidence suggests that as the economy emerges from the lockdowns, while big-city retail is still largely sluggish (The Economist, 2022c), in terms of office employment it is prosperous city centres which are growing the fastest (Hammond, 2022a,b) while suburban areas have not particularly out-performed city centres (Quinio, 2022; Centre for Cities, 2022). Meanwhile, evidence from France suggests that real estate finance markets are adjusting to the local potential for teleworking (Bergeaud et al., 2021), with some city-centre real estate landlords facing difficult times (The Economist, 2022b). The effects of WFH and hybrid working on the productivity of cities (Behrens et al., 2021) and the overall economy (Mischke et al., 2021) will depend on the balance between the introduction of new information and communications technologies, changes in work practices including working-from-home, and the implications for agglomeration processes. As yet, however, there are no clear conclusions as to how these changes will play out.

The reason for this is that in terms of economic geography, the different pieces of evidence emerging still leave many questions unanswered. For example, if there is a flattening of the intra-urban land market due to increased WFH practices, what is the effect of this on city productivity? One argument is that city centres are especially vulnerable to hybrid working changes (Althoff et al., 2022; Gupta et al., 2022) because their economies are very much driven by face-to-face knowledge spillovers. On the other hand, there may be countervailing processes. For example, it could be that many people become more productive due to adopting either full time WFH or hybrid WFH practices, relative to their former full-time in-person presence in the workplace (Nathan and Overman, 2020). This may partially offset city centre productivity losses. At the same time, city centre firms may also be able to downsize or reconfigure their floorspace and office environments in order make better use of their in-person worker time (Mackenzie, 2021), aimed at maximising knowledge exchanges and spillovers within the firm wherever possible while also cutting out as many office-based routine and non-knowledge-intensive work activities as possible. These changes should enhance firm productivity. On the other hand, excessive WFH may inhibit inter-firm urban agglomeration spillovers (Behrens et al., 2021; Nathan and Overman, 2020) thereby reducing firm productivity. Similarly, if workers require increased compensation for the increased residential floorspace required for WFH and hybrid working, this may also reduce firm profitability (Stanton and Tiwari, 2021). Taking all of these considerations

into account, the maximum productivity of the city is likely to be somewhere between full in-person presence in city centres and full WFH patterns (Behrens et al., 2021).

These various insights, however, do not tell us anything about the ways in which the persistent effects of the ‘zoomshock’ affect how cities perform relative to other types of places. Some commentators argue that WFH provides new growth and economic development opportunities to peripheral regions, but this begs the question as to what exactly we mean by ‘peripheral’. Does the ability to work from home (WFH) nowadays make all places more equal in terms of their development opportunities, thereby potentially narrowing inter-regional inequalities? Alternatively, are the effects of WFH on peripheral areas really only related to places on the urban fringe. More fundamentally, does the WFH revolution actually favour certain types of cities over others, thereby potentially widening interregional inequalities, and are there any new types of hinterland effects which may alter the pre-existing urban hierarchy? These questions still remain largely unanswered, but there is some tentative evidence providing some pointers at the likely implications. UK evidence suggests that large cities could potentially double or even triple their commuting hinterlands if workers cut down their commuting on average from five to three days per week, while spending the same overall time commuting per week (Hellen, 2021). In addition, the capacity for remote working varies between countries and also between regions within countries (Özgüzel et al., 2020), depending on the existing sectoral and spatial structures. These observations imply that hybrid working may not only lead to intra-urban spread effects, but also that the WFH revolution may also engender new and complex competition effects between cities and regions (Muro and You, 2021), with some smaller towns which already have weaker economies being especially vulnerable (Eley and Hammond, 2020).

In order to understand the types of economic geography questions which arise from the WFH revolution, it is useful to consider these issues by reference to a simple diagrammatic framework. In Figure 1 we see two cities, one large city X which is highly productive and has a large hinterland, and one smaller city Y with lower productivity. The convex downward-sloping city bid-rent land-price gradients are given as R_X and R_Y , respectively, and these reflect both the productivity performance of the city and also the urban commuting relationships, which are assumed to occur on a daily basis. City X has a much larger hinterland than city Y, which only has a small hinterland. We assume that prior to the ‘zoomshock’, the hinterlands of the two cities did not overlap or encroach on each other. The contiguity of urban hinterlands is commonplace in many parts of Europe, East Asia, or the East Coast of the USA. The empirical evidence outlined above suggests that the advent of Covid-19-induced widespread tele-working and video-conferencing leads to a pivoting upwards and a flattening of city X’s bid-rent curve, for a given level of city-centre productivity. As we see in Figure 2 this benefits the large city in terms of increasing its hinterland. If we assume that the zoomshock advantages for small cities are very small, then the bid-rent curve for the small city will remain largely unchanged post-pandemic.

One potential spatial competition effect of the post-pandemic WFH revolution is thereby to increase the hinterland area of the more prosperous city X, directly encroaching on the local hinterland of the smaller city Y. The larger spatial hinterland for city X increases the job-matching possibilities for hybrid workers in city X, including poaching workers from city Y, and these new job-matching mechanisms militate against falling productivity or land prices in the CBD of city X. Indeed, if WFH allows for better sorting and matching over large hinterland regions, it may be that city X enjoys both rising productivity in its CBD as well as an expanding hinterland, and if these effects are strong enough, they could cast an economic shadow over city Y. Moreover, even if city X does experience falling




Figure 1: A two-city one-dimensional economy pre WFH




Figure 2: A two-city one-dimensional economy post-WFH

CBD productivity and land prices in the short-term, the flattening bid-rent curves may still allow it to poach hinterland workers from city Y. In contrast, city Y is likely to lose some of its already-smaller CBD-related agglomeration advantages, due to the encroachment on its hinterland by city X, unless it is able to maintain its CBD productivity while also experiencing a flattening of its own bid-rent curve. This example suggests that in some circumstances, the new hybrid working practices may offer large and prosperous cities even greater advantages over smaller cities, an observation which has not been widely discussed.

However, addressing these types of issues has, until now, not been possible, for two main reasons. Firstly, there are only a handful of analytical papers aiming to examine the spatial effects of WFH (Behrens et al., 2021; Brueckner et al., 2021; Delventhal et al., 2022; Davis et al., 2021). Almost all existing research on these issues is empirical. Secondly, these small number of analytical papers do not explicitly incorporate the frequency of commuting into their spatial frameworks, and only incorporate economic geography indirectly into their models.² Instead, the existing analytical papers all treat the time in the workplace as simply another parameter, rather than being the key decision-making variable which endogenously reshapes the relationships between other spatial and non-spatial variables. This is important, because the ‘zoomshock’ has allowed the frequency of commuting to become a key choice variable in the decision-making processes of both firms and households. People’s location choices and also their time spent working from home will depend explicitly on their choice of commuting frequency, and in turn their chosen commuting frequency will also endogenously determine their total travel time and travel costs, for any given exogenous set of transport prices. Importantly here, there are specific and non-linear relationships between exogenous transport or vehicle costs and total commuting-frequency costs which are endemic to all frequency optimisation problems (McCann, 2001), and which are evident in the geography of knowledge-related transactions (McCann, 2007; Brunow et al., 2020), in international commuting (McCann et al., 2010; McCann, 2011). The WFH and hybrid working possibilities mean that the choice of commuting frequency becomes an explicit decision-making variable for firms and workers. As such, these specific relationships need to be included in any ‘zoomshock’ related spatial model in order to understand the spatial implications of the WFH revolution.

3 A very simple model of commuting frequency optimisation

In order to begin to understand why to incorporate travel frequency explicitly into any spatial framework, and how we might model these issues, we can consider how both the cost of commuting and the revenue attainable by the firm, both become endogenous to location and commuting frequency decisions. Consider a very simple model in which workers can either WFH or undertake face-to-face work in the city centre CBD, denoted as location Z . $C(d, f)$ is a function of distance and frequency that represents the total pecuniary and opportunity costs associated with less-than-continuous face-to-face contact with clients, customers and suppliers in the CBD, due to WFH. The optimal frequency of commuting balances the trade-offs between saved commuting costs and any reduction in productivity due to less than continuous face-to-face contact. Adopting the approach of McCann (1995, 2007) in its simplest terms, the firm’s total pecuniary and opportunity costs function with respect to

the commuting frequency of the individual workers to the CBD can be written as:

$$C = \phi d^\rho f^n + \theta f^{-m} \quad (1)$$

where d is distance, f is commuting frequency, ϕ is distance costs per km, and ρ , n , and m are all positive constants.

In equation 1, the distance costs are a function of the frequency of commuting where ϕd^ρ represents the level and structure of the costs with respect to distance for each individual trip.³ Meanwhile, θ represents the opportunity costs of individual employees having less-than-continuous face-to-face contact with customers and suppliers at the city centre CBD, Z . The situation of continuous face-to-face interaction with clients at the city centre CBD is defined as where $f \rightarrow \infty$.⁴

However, the opportunity costs θ associated with the lost revenue due to less-than-continuous face-to-face contact at Z can also be re-written as a mark-up ψ on the rent per square metre paid at the city centre $\theta = \psi r_z$, as this reflects the general agglomeration-related advantages for workers choosing a CBD location. As such, the total opportunity costs (including foregone revenues) to the firm which are associated with less-than-infinite commuting frequency by a firm's workers from their residential location to the CBD can be written as:

$$\theta f^{-m} = \psi r_z f^{-m} \quad (2)$$

We can assume for the moment that the floorspace requirement of the firm is fixed, although shortly we will show how this issue can also be examined. This allows us to re-write equation 1 as:

$$C = \phi d^\rho f^n + \psi r_z f^{-m} \quad (3)$$

Differentiating equation 3 with respect to the commuting frequency f and setting to zero we can derive the optimal commuting frequency of workers from any given location at a distance d away from the CBD. Thus.

$$\frac{\partial C}{\partial f} = n\phi d^\rho f^{n-1} - m\psi r_z f^{-m-1} = 0 \quad (4)$$

which gives

$$\frac{m\psi r_z}{f^{m+1}} = n\phi d^\rho f^{n-1} \quad (5)$$

and thus:

$$\frac{m\psi r_z}{n\phi d^\rho} = f^{m+n}. \quad (6)$$

For a worker located at a distance d from the CBD, the optimal commuting frequency f^* from d to Z is given by:

$$\left(\frac{m\psi r_z}{n\phi d^\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{m+n}} = f^*. \quad (7)$$

Equation 7 tells us that for any given worker at a location distance of d away from the CBD, Z , the optimal frequency f^* of commuting of the worker to the CBD is positively related to the opportunity costs of less-than-continuous face-to-face interaction, inversely related to the travel plus travel-time costs. In the normal case where $n = m = \rho = 1$, then the optimal commuting frequency f^* is a square root function of each of the various parameters.

Longer commuting distances d have lower optimal commuting frequencies while activities generating more face-to-face knowledge spillovers will tend to exhibit higher commuting frequencies. The same principles apply to both firms and workers. As shown in the complete model below, the city-wide urban bid-rent curves are also constructed on the basis of endogenously determined optimal commuting frequencies f^* which are uniquely determined for each respective distance d .

4 A model of the city with commuting frequency

Based on this foundation, we construct a model with an Alonso-Muth-Mills (AMM) city structure and characterise bid-rent curves, density, spatial distribution and optimal commuting behaviour as workers respond to the WFH revolution. As above, the city is centred at Z and commuting occurs via the city centre. The main differences between this model and other AMM-type models is that this city has two types of buildings, housing and offices, and we optimise commuting behaviour. This allows for a more realistic city structure and sharing of commuting costs between firms and workers. Consumers have a taste for larger homes, while demand for office space is inelastic. As a result, offices cluster around near the city centre and homes sit in the region beyond the commercial area. Workers produce differentiated intermediate goods that are combined in a standard CES production function into final goods which can be transported costlessly around the city.

4.1 People

Workers inelastically supply their labour in the city centre and (for WAW) commute from their homes to their office location via the city centre. This assumption is for analytical convenience in order to treat the cost of commuting from the city centre to the office as a separate trip to the resident's commute from home to the city centre.⁵ People living in the city choose their home location d_h relative to the city centre Z where $d = 0$, the size of their home h and consumption of final goods y to maximise utility,

$$\max U(d_h, y, h) = y^{1-\mu} h^\mu \quad 0 < \mu < 1, d_h \geq 0. \quad (8)$$

People face a budget constraint that their income is sufficient to pay for commuting costs to the city centre, consumption of final goods and consumption of home space

$$w(Z) \geq \phi d_h f^n + \theta_h f^{-m} + y + h.r(d_h) \quad d_h \geq 0 \quad (9)$$

where f is the frequency of commuting, ϕ is a distance-based commuting cost, $w(Z)$ is the market wage in the city centre Z , θ_h is reduced wages that the worker might have to incur due to a fall in productivity when working from home and $r(d_h)$ is the rent per unit of home space in the location of their home. Other centripetal forces could also operate but for simplicity we assume commuting to the city centre is the only centripetal force in the model for residents. In spatial equilibrium people are indifferent between locations, $\frac{\partial U}{\partial d_h} = 0$. Rent and commuting costs are paid to local landlords and transport providers who consume only final goods. This allows general equilibrium effects from changes in land value without introducing a cumbersome redistribution externality into location decisions.

Standard optimization of Cobb-Douglas utility implies that consumers spend a constant portion of their income after commuting costs on housing space and the remaining share on

final goods.

$$\mu (w(Z) - \phi d_h f^n - \theta_h f^{-m}) = h.r(d_h) \quad (10)$$

and

$$(1 - \mu) (w(Z) - \phi d_h f^n - \theta_h f^{-m}) = y. \quad (11)$$

For a homogeneous population, all residents have the same utility. Totally differentiating $U(r(d_h), w(Z) - \phi d_h f^n)$ with respect to distance and rearranging, the slope of the bid-rent curve in the residential area is:

$$\frac{\partial r(d_h)}{\partial d_h} = -\frac{1}{\mu} \frac{r(d_h) \cdot \phi f^n}{w(Z) - \phi d_h f^n - \theta_h f^{-m}} = -\frac{\phi f^n}{h(d_h)} \quad (12)$$

where $h(d_h)$ is the solution found above in equation 10. This meets the Alonso-Muth condition that $\frac{\partial r(d_h)}{\partial d_h} < 0$ for the region of the city containing homes.

4.2 Firms

Firms choose their location relative to the city centre to maximise profit subject to demand for their variety and the free entry condition such that the competitive profit is just sufficient to pay for fixed management costs (F), $\pi_i - F = 0$. The maximisation problem for an intermediate firm located at d_o is:

$$\max \pi = \left(p_i - (w(Z) - \theta_h f^{-m} + \phi \cdot d_o \cdot f^n + \bar{a} \cdot \theta_o f^{-m} + r(d_o) \cdot g) \frac{1}{\bar{a}} \right) x_i \quad (13)$$

subject to the free entry condition $\pi_i = F$ where θ_o is the opportunity cost in terms of reduced productivity due to WFH, θ_h is the reduction in wage costs due to lower wages for workers who WFH, and g is the units of office space required per employee.⁶ For analytical simplicity we assume symmetric productivity of homogenous workers given by \bar{a} . Since there is free entry, firms can choose to locate anywhere and there is costless trade within the city. In spatial equilibrium rents at each location adjust such that firms have the same marginal cost of production which allows for symmetric firms. i.e. $c = (w(Z) + \phi \cdot d_o \cdot f^n + (\bar{a} \theta_o - \theta_h) f^{-m} + r(d_o) \cdot g) \frac{1}{\bar{a}}$ is the same for all firms and locations where firms operate. Firms are small enough that they also ignore the effect of their own demand for office space and workers on the price of office space or the wage rate because firms and workers are mobile, firms are indifferent between locations and any individual firm is too small to affect city-wide density or wages (i.e. $\frac{\partial r(d_o)}{\partial p_i} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial w(d_o)}{\partial p_i} = 0$). These assumptions are plausible with a sufficiently large number of firms.⁷ Optimisation finds that price is a mark-up over marginal cost, as is standard with CES demand:

$$p_i = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} (w(Z) + \phi \cdot d_o \cdot f^n + (\bar{a} \theta_o - \theta_h) f^{-m} + r(d_o) \cdot g) \frac{1}{\bar{a}}. \quad (14)$$

Substituting into the free entry condition and rearranging finds output per firm.

In spatial equilibrium, with costless trade, all firms have the same prices. Totally differentiating price with respect to distance d_o and rearranging

$$\frac{\partial r(d_o)}{\partial d_o} = -\frac{\phi f^n}{g}. \quad (15)$$

That is, for each additional unit of distance rent decreases according to the change in frequency of commuting and the office space required per employee. This differential equation

also meets the Alonso-Muth condition that $\frac{\partial r(d_o)}{\partial d_o} < 0$ for the region of the city containing office space.

Note that for both homes and offices, the slope of the bid-rent curve is only affected by frequency in terms of commuting costs, but the slope is not affected by the opportunity cost to productivity due to WFH.

4.3 Construction

Perfectly competitive developers create building space throughout the city using land (L) and capital (K) with constant returns to scale to produce $B(d)$ units of building space per unit of land at a distance d from the city centre. The rental price of land is denoted $R(d)$ (as opposed to the lower case for renting building space). Building space can be used for either offices or homes and there is no cost difference in their construction. A property developer faces the maximisation problem:

$$\max \pi = r.B - K - R.L \quad (16)$$

where B is the CRS production function for units of building space, R is the price per unit of land, L is units of land and K is capital. Since the rental price of capital is the same everywhere and exogenous, it is omitted. A developers profit is zero with perfect competition. The zero profit condition for developers can also be written

$$r(d) = \frac{R(d) + K(d)}{B(d)}. \quad (17)$$

Totally differentiating with respect to distance and rearranging

$$\frac{\partial R(d)}{\partial d} = \frac{\partial r(d)}{\partial d} B(d). \quad (18)$$

We assume the building space production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form $B = \alpha L^\beta K^{1-\beta}$ where α describes the productivity of the construction industry, L is units of land and K is units of capital. By substitution, the maximization problem for construction is:

$$\max \pi_d = r.\alpha.L^\beta K^{1-\beta} - K - R.L = 0. \quad (19)$$

Optimisation finds that the land price per unit is a function of the ratio of capital and land.

$$R = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \frac{K}{L} \quad (20)$$

Rearranging the building space production function, the capital to land ratio for a developer is:

$$\frac{K}{L} = \left(\frac{B}{\alpha.L} \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} \quad (21)$$

By substitution:

$$R = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \cdot \left(\frac{B}{\alpha.L} \right)^{1/(1-\beta)} \quad (22)$$

By substitution and rearranging, the optimal price of land as a function of building space rent in that location is:

$$R(r(d)) = \beta(1-\beta)^{(1-\beta)/\beta} \cdot (\alpha.r(d))^{1/\beta}. \quad (23)$$

Alternatively, the rental price of building space can be written as a function of the rental price of land:

$$r(R(d)) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot R(d)^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}. \quad (24)$$

4.4 Closing the model

The closed city model is determined by exogenously defining the population of the city is a fixed parameter N , and equilibrium is solved by distributing population and jobs such that utility is maximised and equalized across locations, since all residents and jobs are otherwise homogeneous. The following conditions define the extent of the city and the regions containing offices and homes. Since space required for jobs is inelastic, but consumers have a preference for home space, it follows that the central city will be used for office space, and the surrounding region used for homes. Starting in the city centre, building space will be used for office space if its value exceeds the value of using it for homes. Developers build if the value of land containing buildings of any kind exceeds the value of land not used for buildings (i.e. some other alternative use such as agriculture $R(A)$).⁸

The region of the city containing offices must be sufficient to employ the population and the region containing homes should be sufficient to hold homes for the population $N = \int_{-\tilde{d}_o}^{\tilde{d}_o} j(d) dd$ and $N = \int_{-\tilde{d}_h}^{-\tilde{d}_o} n(d) dd + \int_{\tilde{d}_o}^{\tilde{d}_h} n(d) dd$ where $j(d)$ is the density of jobs to land and $n(d)$ is population density. In a symmetric city, this can be written:

$$N/2 = \int_0^{\tilde{d}_o} j(d) dd \quad (25)$$

and

$$N/2 = \int_{\tilde{d}_o}^{\tilde{d}_h} n(d) dd. \quad (26)$$

Using equations 15 and 18 the density of jobs to land is

$$j(d_o) = -\frac{1}{\phi f^n} \frac{\partial R(d)}{\partial d}. \quad (27)$$

Similarly using equations 12 and 18 population density is

$$n(d_o) = -\frac{1}{\phi f^n} \frac{\partial R(d)}{\partial d}. \quad (28)$$

Substituting into the market clearing conditions above (equations 25 and 26), solving the integrals, and rearranging finds that land rent in the city centre is

$$R(0) = R(A) + \phi f^n N. \quad (29)$$

By substitution, building space rent in the city centre is:

$$r(0) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot (R(A) + \phi f^n N)^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}. \quad (30)$$

Therefore, rent for office space is:

$$r(d_o) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot (R(A) + \phi f^n N)^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{\phi f^m d_o}{g}. \quad (31)$$

and rent for home space is:

$$r(d_h) = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot (R(A) + \phi f^n N)^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha} + \left(\frac{1}{h(d_h)} - \frac{1}{g}\right) \phi f^n \tilde{d}_o - \frac{\phi f^n d_h}{h(d_h)} \quad (32)$$

The boundary of the commercial district and the residential area can be calculated accordingly where $R(\tilde{d}_o) = R(d_h)$ and $R(\tilde{d}_h) = R(A)$ respectively.

4.5 Optimal commuting frequency

Commuting costs from homes to offices via the CBD are already apportioned above on the basis of location choices: Workers pay the cost of commuting from their homes to the CBD and firms pay the cost of workers commuting from the CBD to the office. When workers commute less frequently, the commuting cost savings are apportioned in the same way, but firms will also reduce wages due to lower productivity. Workers will only be willing to accept lower wages if the savings from reduced commuting are still sufficient to make workers better off than daily commuting. In equilibrium, there is an optimal agreed frequency of commuting and reduction in wages that also shares the cost of reduced productivity due to hybrid WFH.

Substituting equilibrium consumption of final goods and home space into the utility function (Equation 8) and differentiating with respect to the frequency of commuting, setting to zero, and rearranging gives optimal commuting preferences for workers. For a worker living at a distance d_h from the city centre, the optimal commuting frequency as a function of their reduced wages and location relative to the CBD is:

$$f^* = \left(\frac{m\theta_h}{n\phi d_h}\right)^{\frac{1}{m+n}}. \quad (33)$$

Similarly, differentiating firm profit (Equation 8) with respect to frequency of commuting and rearranging gives optimal commuting frequency for firms. For a firm with an office located at distance d_o from the city centre the optimal commuting frequency as a function of reduced productivity and the location of the office relative to the CBD is:

$$f^* = \left(\frac{m(\bar{a}\theta_o - \theta_h)}{n\phi d_o}\right)^{\frac{1}{m+n}}. \quad (34)$$

Note that even in this more complex model with a two-activity land-use pattern, these results are essentially the same as in the simple model in Section 3 (Equation 7).

In order to agree on commuting frequency, firms and workers will negotiate the reduction in wages. Combining these commuting frequency preferences for workers and firms and rearranging finds that the equilibrium reduction in wages is:

$$\frac{d_h}{d_o + d_h} \bar{a}\theta_o = \theta_h. \quad (35)$$

This means that workers bear a portion of the opportunity cost to productivity based on their share of commuting costs. Workers also save their $\frac{d_h}{d_o + d_h}$ share of overall commuting costs. Similarly, firms bear a portion of the opportunity cost to productivity equal to the firm's $\frac{d_o}{d_o + d_h}$ share of commuting costs and save a $\frac{d_o}{d_o + d_h}$ share of overall commuting costs.

Taken together, workers will undertake hybrid-WFH if the overall reduction in productivity per day due to working from home is less than the overall cost of commuting, generating a productivity improvement overall.

This allocation of commuting costs and opportunity costs to productivity is efficient since costs are apportioned on the basis of each party's location decision. Workers face a distance-based share of commuting costs based on the location of their home and a distance-based cost of lower productivity per day working from home. This is efficient since their preference for frequency of commuting is a function of their distance from the CBD. Similarly, firms face a cost of commuting and an opportunity cost of lower productivity per day when workers are working from home, based on the location of the office relative to the CBD. While these analytical results are based on our simplifying assumption that commuting occurs via the CBD, it implies that the pecuniary and opportunity costs and benefits of working from home will be apportioned in the same way that commuting costs are already apportioned. Of course, while this apportioning is efficient, in reality, the actual commuting frequency outcomes for individual workers in individual firms will depend on both firm and worker preferences (Aksoy et al., 2022), as well as bargaining practices and legal powers which differ across countries and sectors. However, the point remains that in terms of urban productivity, this apportioning is efficient.

5 How WFH reshapes cities

While the Alonso-Muth-Mills approach is usually only associated with intra-city analysis, there are also inter-city effects. The complexity of the two activity model (homes and offices) makes tractable solutions to an open city model difficult. Below are the results from above, for home space only, commuting to the city centre at Z, without considering the role of office space.

5.1 Intra-city implications

Firstly, examining how the worker's share of opportunity costs to productivity is passed on in their wage based on equation 35, workers who choose to live further from the CBD will bear a greater share of the opportunity cost to productivity per day working from home, but not the entire cost, and commute less frequently. Similarly, firms with offices located further from CBD locations will have workers who commute less frequently and will bear a greater share of the opportunity cost to productivity per day working from home, but will be able to save on rent of office space. Both of these forces imply that workers will tend to live further from the city centre and offices will tend to locate further from the centre, because workers now commute less frequently. This observation is also clear if we observe the location of the office-residential boundary:

$$\left(\frac{1}{1-\beta}\right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha} \left((R(A) + \phi f^m N)^\beta - \left(R(A) + \phi f^m \frac{N}{2} \right)^\beta \right) \frac{g}{\phi f^m} = \tilde{d}_o, \quad (36)$$

and the location of the city boundary:

$$\frac{\frac{(R(A)+\phi f^m N)^\beta}{\phi f^m R(A)^\beta} \mu \cdot w(Z) + \tilde{d}_o \left(1 - \frac{A \mu \cdot w(Z)}{g \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot R(A)^\beta} \right) - \frac{\mu \cdot w(Z)}{\phi f^m}}{1 + \phi f^m \frac{(R(A)+\phi f^m N)^\beta}{\phi f^m R(A)^\beta} - \tilde{d}_o \frac{A \mu \phi f^m}{g \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot R(A)^\beta} - \mu} = \tilde{d}_h. \quad (37)$$

Holding all else constant, a decline in f results in a greater boundary distance and a decreased density of office building locations and home locations, i.e. the donut effect.

People will tend to move further out within the city they live and work in because commuting is less burdensome, allowing them to have larger homes in places where building space is cheaper. Businesses will also tend to move further out because their share of commuting is less costly when commuting occurs less frequently, allowing them to have offices further from the city centre. Allowing for existing settlement patterns, initially this would imply a decline in the prices and rents of inner city building space, and an increase in the suburbs, exurbs and hinterland communities within commuting distance.

5.2 Inter-city implications

There are also implications for location choices between cities. Firstly, examine the utility equation. Holding all else constant, a decrease in f , generates a utility gain. Comparing two cities, a reduction in commuting results in a greater utility gain in the city with longer commuting distances d_h to the CBD, i.e. larger cities.

$$\bar{U} = (1 - \mu)^{1-\mu} \mu^\mu \frac{w(Z) - \phi d_h f^m}{r (d_h)^\mu} \quad (38)$$

Similarly, observe the wage equation, substituting rent in the city centre in equation 30. Holding all else constant, a decrease in f leads to a greater wage increase in a larger city than a smaller city.

$$w(Z) = \bar{a}_i (\sigma - 1) \sigma^{\sigma/1-\sigma} \left(\frac{F}{Y} \right)^{1/1-\sigma} - \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta} \beta^\beta \cdot (R(A) + \phi f^m N)^\beta \cdot \frac{1}{A} \cdot g(f). \quad (39)$$

Lastly observe frequency optimisation in equations 33 and 34 and substitute the solution for apportioning the opportunity cost between firms and workers:

$$f^* = \left(\frac{m \bar{a} \theta_o}{n \phi (d_o + d_h)} \right)^{\frac{1}{m+n}} \quad (40)$$

The frequency of commuting will be lower for workers with a longer commuting distance, both from homes or to offices. But the impact on wages is only proportional to the worker's *share* of overall commuting costs. In other words, there is a bigger reduction in frequency when working from home for workers in larger cities, and a bigger welfare gain from reducing frequency in larger cities than smaller cities. This prediction concurs with recent empirical evidence from the American Community Survey that commuting zones with longer commuting times experienced higher rates of remote work (Ozimek and Carlson, 2022). This result is only possible in our model, because we allow for workers and firms to optimise commuting frequency.

As a result of these three effects, a return to spatial equilibrium implies migration towards, or employment switching to, the cities with more remote work, which is already

observed in recent data (Mondragon and Wieland, 2022). This implies increases in economic activity in larger metropolitan areas and their hinterlands, where utility and wages have increased by a greater amount than in smaller cities, since commuting is now less burdensome. Rather than allowing work-from-anywhere, this implies potential shadow effects on smaller cities that are too distant to host commuting hybrid WFH workers as residents move to larger cities and their hinterlands where there are greater benefits from hybrid WFH opportunities.

6 Discussion

The two key results which jointly emerge from this analysis are that in response to the WFH-‘zoomshock’ revolution, the intra-urban rent gradient flattens, giving rise to the so-called ‘donut’ effect, and also that this flattening favours the larger cities, giving rise to an inter-urban ‘shadow’ (Cuberes et al., 2021) effect. In other words, the joint effect depicted in Figures 1 and 2 holds. The shadow effect which favours larger cities is a result which appears to be counterintuitive to most commentaries on the spatial implications of the ‘zoomshock’, which have tended to emphasise the potential economic development possibilities for smaller and more remote places. However, our result implies that falls in commuting frequency favour larger places where commuting distances are longer. We regard these two results as being the first-order effects of the WFH-‘zoomshock’ revolution in the sense that they are the direct result of the new frequency optimisation choices made by firms and workers. In addition, there are potential additional second-order effects we can consider concerning spatial sorting and local income-expenditure multipliers

Regarding the first likely second-order effect, namely spatial sorting, it is potentially possible to extend our analysis to include additional intra-urban and inter-urban sorting effects. The underlying competitive model assumes symmetric intermediate firms, though these firms will choose different combinations of WAW and WFH due to offices and homes locating in different places. In the intra-city context, a more complex version of the model could include heterogeneous intermediate firms that experience different opportunity costs of WFH in terms of productivity. We have left this complication out of the model for simplicity, in order to retain parsimonious analytical results, but our results still point to how heterogeneous firms might affect outcomes. It would imply that firms sort into locations based on this productivity cost. Firms that find WFH particularly costly to their productivity because they rely on more face-to-face interaction would sort into more central locations where it is easier to commute and optimizing frequency would generate more frequent commuting. Similarly, their employees could be expected to sort into more central residential locations if they spend more time doing work at work, since wages will be less impacted by commuting more frequently. Firms that require less WAW would sort into more distant locations where rent is cheaper, since they are less impacted by frequency optimisation generating less frequent commuting. These more remote workers could shift further into the metro-hinterland.

The other possible second-order effect we can consider is that of the implications for local income-expenditure multipliers. If higher skilled workers in smaller centres are now more able to switch employment to the larger more distant cities, this will imply that their incomes will increase. As such, this also implies that the local expenditure multipliers may increase, providing possible new opportunities for local entrepreneurs in smaller cities. At the same time, the switching away by high human capital workers from local jobs to jobs in

larger more distant cities may have a deleterious effect on the local agglomeration processes, as we have already explained. In addition, higher income groups buying more income-elastic goods and services tend to have more spatially diffuse spending patterns than lower income groups, so there are also multiplier pressures pushing against local growth. The overall effects on the smaller cities will therefore depend on the balance between these two opposing effects. As yet, there is no empirical evidence on these issues

In terms of inter-city sorting, with heterogeneous firms there could also be some re-sorting of activities between cities. Activities that face lower opportunity costs due to WFH and so make a greater shift to WFH are now more likely to relocate to larger metro areas from smaller metro areas, because the burden of commuting is now a smaller deterrent for firms to locate in the biggest cities. Activities that require face-to-face interaction already sort into city centres and would be even more able to shift to city centres in the largest cities because there will be a decline in rent in these places as firms with greater WFH shift further out. These potential long-term sorting effects would all appear to favour both city centres and also larger cities, thereby enhancing the results we have already derived. In the long run, city centres and larger cities, in particular, are likely to benefit from even greater concentrations of face-to-face knowledge intensive activities.

Returning to the first-order effects, all of these inter-city results counterintuitively imply that WFH will tend to relocate economic activity from more rural and remote places to larger metropolitan areas that extend their hinterlands. Before the emergence of working from home, these were activities that were deterred from a metropolitan location by the exorbitant commute. As a result, the work from home revolution implies a kind of shadow effect on small towns and cities that don't really benefit much at all from the opportunity to commute less frequently.

7 Concluding remarks

The explicit inclusion of geography and the optimisation of commuting behaviour in terms of both location and frequency provides a much more nuanced description of how the WFH revolution affects cities with counterintuitive implications. Ultimately commuting behaviour is a trade-off between productivity at the margin with frequency and location that will vary considerably by industry and location. This trade-off provides the greatest benefit to people and firms choosing to locate in large cities because these are the locations where commuting is most burdensome. For any job where at least some tasks offer higher productivity with face-to-face interaction there will be an optimal frequency of commuting for hybrid WFH that allows workers to live further from their workplace, and allows workplaces to locate further from city centres. But the overall behaviour of such hybrid workers is even more nuanced.

Most notably, the ability to WFH sometimes, makes commuting less costly for both workers and employers. While it is a limitation in our approach that we do not directly model migration between cities, our results imply migration of both workers and firms from smaller towns to larger metropolitan areas because of the reduction in the burden of commuting. It means that commuting is now less of a deterrent to locating in a large city, so both firms and workers face a stronger attraction to relocate to larger cities, or at least their hinterlands, which used to have a costly commute. This result is true whether work is entirely remote or hybrid. Essentially, commuting is a significant burden of living in large metro areas and the shift to fully- or partially- remote work reduces that burden by a greater

amount in places with longer commutes resulting in a greater welfare gain in large cities and for people who relocate to large cities. Rather than allowing work from anywhere, the work from home revolution generates greater forces to live within a commutable distance of ever-larger cities.

Arguably, this force could be counteracted if some of the productivity benefits of agglomeration economies are now shared more widely by smaller cities able to access remote work tools. But only to the extent that the decrease in relative productivity between small and large cities is greater than the savings from reduced commuting by working remotely in the larger city. However, given these technologies are designed for WFH, not WAW in smaller cities, it is also not at all clear that this will be the case. While some of the former agglomeration benefits may now be accessible anywhere, it is only for jobs that become fully-remote that would imply activity shifts away from the larger cities and their hinterlands. Furthermore, fully-remote work may be gradually outsourced overseas in much the same way that it already is. Nonetheless, the largest cities also offer amenities so the reduced burden of commuting would still imply that even fully-remote workers face a greater increase in the attractiveness of the hinterlands of large cities than rural areas. This means that the only rural areas that would truly benefit from fully-remote work would be those places with significant natural amenities that could not previously host those activities. As yet, there is no evidence that the WFH-‘zoomshock’ revolution has spurred innovation and productivity growth in general (The Economist, 2022a). However, our analysis implies that the returns to productivity growth will be reconfigured spatially, and this reconfiguring is likely to benefit larger and more prosperous cities than smaller or less prosperous places.

Notes

¹Evidence from the US suggests that 84% of residential moves are within the same metro area, with 7.5% moving beyond the existing metropolitan or micropolitan area but staying within the same state, with another 6% moving away from their existing area to one of the top 50 metro areas, and only 0.28% leaving their metropolitan or micropolitan areas altogether (Patino et al., 2021).

²Behrens et al. (2021); Davis et al. (2021); Gokan et al. (2022); Kyriakopoulou and Picard (2022) all treat commuting frequency only indirectly by discussing the share of time allocated to in-person activities at the workplace varying between zero and 1, but do not address the endogenous relationships between travel costs and travel frequencies explicitly. Meanwhile Liu and Su (2022) do not address this issue even indirectly, instead characterising workers whose share of WFH is either zero or 1. Brueckner et al. (2021) note that WFH or hybrid working reduces the per-mile transport costs t for any distance x between the home and the workplace, although again, they do not address the fact that t is not exogenous and itself depends on the total vehicle miles undertaken, which itself in turn depends on t (Delventhal et al., 2022), something first explained by McCann (1995, 2001). Delventhal et al. (2022) estimate these total vehicle miles on the basis of empirical data, and then insert these calibrated values into a model structure, rather than developing the location and WFH model itself from the commuting frequency optimisation problem.

³This approach is different to the standard urban economics approach which employs the iceberg costs construction (Behrens et al., 2021). In the case where distance is an explicit consideration the iceberg structure is inconsistent with typically observed transport rate structures (McCann, 1995), all of which vary with respect to the square root of distance (McCann, 2001; Bosker and Garretsen, 2010) precisely because of these frequency-optimisation issues (McCann, 2001). Furthermore, while a strong assumption in urban economics is that transport costs are directly associated with the wage rate, as reflecting the opportunity costs of time, the empirical evidence suggest that these account for no more than 15% of commuting costs (Van Ommeren and Dargay, 2006). Moreover, the use of modern internet-based technologies means that commuting nowadays often involves working-on-the-move, such that the time-related opportunity costs are further reduced, in some cases to close to zero. To a large extent commuting also takes place primar-

ily out-of-office hours, and accounts for no more than 15%-20% of all trips (Tomer et al., 2020). These various observations combine to weaken, or even undermine, the empirical veracity of the simple iceberg assumption in the context of employment-commuting frequency choices, unless the iceberg stricture itself is complemented by an additional distance-frequency related features, as is done here.

⁴For businesses, commercial face-to-face interactions can take place multiple times a day between different personnel, and indeed, this is exactly how many high value knowledge-intensive and business services and retailing activities work. In principle, the maximum value of f for such businesses can be in terms of many thousands of such interactions per year. For commuting workers, the situation is different. Each worker will typically commute to and from work once per day. In terms of the number of working days, a typical year has 261 working days. Adding public holidays to paid leave allowances mean that a typical US worker will annually work approximately 235 days, while across the OECD the typical number of working days per year are between 225 and 230. These values represent the maximum value of f for commuters, which is much lower than for business interactions, but the analytical principles remain largely the same.

⁵This commuting route is assumed because it generates intuitive analytical results about the allocation of commuting costs between workers and firms. In reality this cost may be less and its allocation will be subject to a negotiation between firms and workers, though a competitive outcome would be similar since it would imply that the costs fall where they are incurred: The cost-sharing result in this paper reflects the relative market power of workers and employers based on their locations. A more realistic assumption that office locations are selected on the basis of work-day trips to elsewhere in the city and home locations are selected on the basis of commuting from homes to offices, does not lend itself to intuitive analytical results, but the same optimisation principles would apply to this more complex framework.

⁶This could be a function with additional microfoundations not examined here. In particular these foundations would include the coordination of remote work on different days, the share of workers who can hot-desk and the share of in-person tasks that are team-based, or the type of office space required for in-person tasks.

⁷See Bond-Smith (2022) for how the analysis would be adapted to a smaller discrete number of firms.

⁸Land price must have some positive value, otherwise quantity of housing tends to infinity in our specification.

References

- Aksoy, C. G., Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Dolls, M., and Zarate, P. (2022). Working from home around the world. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, BPEA Conference Drafts*.
- Althoff, L., Eckert, F., Ganapati, S., and Walsh, C. (2022). The Geography of Remote Work. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 93(C).
- Bangham, G. and Gustafsson, M. (2020). The time of your life: Time use in london and the uk over the past 40 years. Technical report, Resolution Foundation.
- Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2020). Covid-19 is also a reallocation shock. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Summer:329–371.
- Bartik, A. W., Cullen, Z. B., Glaeser, E. L., Luca, M., and Stanton, C. T. (2020). What jobs are being done at home during the covid-19 crisis? evidence from firm-level surveys. Working Paper 27422, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Behrens, K., Kichko, S., and Thisse, J.-F. (2021). Working from home: Too much of a good thing? *CEPR Working Paper Series*, (8831).
- Bergeaud, A., Eyméoud, J.-B., Garcia, T., and Henricot, D. (2021). Working from home and corporate real estate. *Working paper*.

- Bloom, N. (2020). How working from home works out. Policy brief, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR).
- Bloom, N. (2022). I've been studying work-from-home for years. here's what's coming. *Barron's*, (<https://www.barrons.com/articles/ive-been-studying-work-from-home-for-years-heres-whats-coming-51641330825>).
- Bond-Smith, S. (2022). Discretely innovating: The effect of limited market contestability on innovation and growth. *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 69(3):301–327.
- Bosker, M. and Garretsen, H. (2010). Trade costs in empirical new economic geography. *Papers in Regional Science*, 89(3):485–511.
- Brinatti, A., Cavallo, A., Cravino, J., and Drenik, A. (2021). The International Price of Remote Work. NBER Working Papers 29437, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce-Lockhart, C., Campbell, C., and Burn-Murdoch, J. (2021). Late rising, video calls and uk holidays — britain's 'new normal'. *Financial Times*.
- Brucks, M. S. and Levav, J. (2022). Virtual communication curbs creative idea generation. *Nature*, 605(7908):108–112.
- Brueckner, J., Kahn, M., and Lin, G. C. (2021). A new spatial hedonic equilibrium in the emerging work-from-home economy? NBER Working Papers 28526, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brunow, S., Hammer, A., and McCann, P. (2020). The impact of kibs' location on their innovation behaviour. *Regional Studies*, 54(9):1289–1303.
- Centre for Cities (2022). Cities outlook 2022. Technical report, Centre for Cities.
- Cheshire, P. C., Hilber, C., and Schöni, O. (2021). The pandemic and the housing market: a british story. *Centre for Economic Performance Working Paper*.
- Chun, Y., Hauptert, T., Roll, S., Fox-Dichter, S., and Grinstein-Weiss, M. (2022). Did the pandemic advance new suburbanization? Technical report, The Brookings Institution.
- Cuberes, D., Desmet, K., and Rappaport, J. (2021). Urban growth shadows. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 123:103334.
- Davis, M. A., Ghent, A. C., and Gregory, J. M. (2021). The Work-from-Home Technology Boon and its Consequences. NBER Working Papers 28461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- de Graaff, T. and Rietveld, P. (2004). Ict and substitution between out-of-home and at-home work: The importance of timing. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 36(5):879–896.
- de Graaff, T. and Rietveld, P. (2007). Substitution between working at home and out-of-home: The role of ICT and commuting costs. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 41(2):142–160.

- Delventhal, M. J., Kwon, E., and Parkhomenko, A. (2022). Jue insight: How do cities change when we work from home? *Journal of Urban Economics*, 127:103331. JUE Insights: COVID-19 and Cities.
- Dingel, J. I. and Neiman, B. (2020). How many jobs can be done at home? *Journal of Public Economics*, 189.
- Eley, J. and Hammond, G. (2020). Workers will be lured back to the office, says brookfield chief. *Financial Times*.
- Emanuel, N. and Harrington, E. (2021). "working" remotely? selection, treatment, and market provision of remote work. *Working Paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University*.
- Felstead, A. and Feuschke, D. (2020). Homeworking in the uk: Before and during the 2020 lockdown. Wiserd report, Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Available for download from: <https://wiserd.ac.uk/publications/homeworking-ukand-during-2020-lockdown>.
- Fraja, G. D., Matheson, J., and Rockey, J. (2021). Zoomshock: The geography and local labour market consequences of working from home. *Covid Economics*, Issue 64:1–41.
- Frey, W. H. (2022). New census data shows a huge spike in movement out of big metro areas during the pandemic. Technical report, The Brookings Institution.
- Gibbs, M., Mengel, F., and Siemroth, C. (2022). Work from home & productivity: Evidence from personnel & analytics data on it professionals. *Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics*, forthcoming.
- Gokan, T., Kichko, S., and Thisse, J. (2022). On the impact of telecommuting on cities. LSE, Paper presented at the CEP Center for Economic Performance Seminar.
- Gupta, A., Mittal, V., Peeters, J., and Nieuwerburgh, S. V. (2021). Flattening the Curve: Pandemic-Induced Revaluation of Urban Real Estate. NBER Working Papers 28675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gupta, A., Mittal, V., and Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2022). Work from home and the office real estate apocalypse. *SSRN Paper 4124698*.
- Haldane, A. (2020). Is home working good for you? Speech given by Andy Haldane, Bank of England Chief Economist and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
- Hammond, G. (2022a). British land's leases hit fastest pace in a decade. *Financial Times*.
- Hammond, G. (2022b). Return to uk offices hits highest since pandemic began. *Financial Times*.
- Hellen, N. (2021). Commuters leave the office far behind. *The Sunday Times*.
- JLL (2020). Reimagining human experience: How to embrace the new work-life priorities and expectations of a liquid workforce. Technical report, JLL Global Research.
- Kyriakopoulou, E. and Picard, P. M. (2022). The zoom city: Working from home and urban land structure. *Unpublished working paper*.

- Lee, J. and Huang, Y. (2022). Covid-19 impact on us housing markets: evidence from spatial regression models. *Spatial Economic Analysis*, 0(0):1–21.
- Liu, S. and Su, Y. (2022). The effect of working from home on the agglomeration economies of cities: evidence from advertised wages. *SSRN Paper 4109630*.
- Mackenzie, M. (2021). Workers will be lured back to the office, says brookfield chief. *Financial Times*.
- McCann, P. (1995). Journey and transactions frequency: An alternative explanation of rent-gradient convexity. *Urban Studies*, 32(9):1549–1556.
- McCann, P. (2001). A proof of the relationship between optimal vehicle size, haulage length and the structure of distance-transport costs. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 35(8):671–693.
- McCann, P. (2007). Sketching out a model of innovation, face-to-face interaction and economic geography. *Spatial Economic Analysis*, 2(2):117–134.
- McCann, P. (2011). International business and economic geography: knowledge, time and transactions costs. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 11(2):309–317.
- McCann, P., Poot, J., and Sanderson, L. (2010). Migration, relationship capital and international travel: theory and evidence. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 10(3):361–387.
- Mischke, J., Woetzel, J., Smit, S., Manyika, J., Ramaswamy, S., Birshan, M., Windhagen, E., Schubert, J., Hieronimus, S., Dagorret, G., and Noguer, M. C. (2021). Will productivity and growth return after the covid-19 crisis? Technical report, McKinsey Global Institute.
- Mondragon, J. A. and Wieland, J. (2022). Housing demand and remote work. Working Paper 30041, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Muro, M. and You, Y. (2021). In some cities, the pandemic’s economic pain may continue for a decade. Brookings metropolitan policy program, The Brookings Institution.
- Nathan, M. and Overman, H. (2020). Will coronavirus cause a big city exodus? *Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science*, 47(9):1537–1542.
- Özgüzel, C., Veneri, P., and Ahrend, R. (2020). Capacity for remote working can affect lockdown costs differently across places. Technical report, OECD.
- Ozimek, A. and Carlson, C. (2022). The uneven geography of remote work. Economic Innovation Group.
- Patino, M., Kessler, A., Holder, S., Gu, J., and Rojanasakul, M. (2021). More americans are leaving cities, but don’t call it an urban exodus. *Bloomberg*.
- Quinio, V. (2022). Have suburban high streets really received a ‘work from home’ boost? Technical report, Centre for Cities.
- Ramani, A. and Bloom, N. (2021). The doughnut effect of covid-19 on cities. VoxEU.

- Sawhill, I. V. and Katherine, G. (2020). The middle class time squeeze. Economic studies at brookings, The Brookings Institution.
- Sostero, M., Milasi, S., Hurley, J., Fernandez-Macías, E., and Bisello, M. (2020). Teleworkability and the covid-19 crisis: a new digital divide. JRC Working Paper Series on Labor, Education and Technology 05, Joint Research Centre, European Commission.
- Stanton, C. T. and Tiwari, P. (2021). Housing Consumption and the Cost of Remote Work. NBER Working Papers 28483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- The Economist (2021). The race for space: House prices in the rich world are booming. unusually, suburbs not cities are feeling the heat.
- The Economist (2022a). The missing pandemic innovation boom: Digitisation and new ways of working were meant to unleash productivity growth. what went wrong?
- The Economist (2022b). The true cost of empty offices: Property investors are sitting on big losses.
- The Economist (2022c). Uk high streets bound back from covid curbs as london falters: Britains suburbs and small towns benefit from pandemic shift towards local shopping.
- Tomer, A., Kane, J., and Vey, J. S. (2020). Connecting people and places: Exploring new measures of travel behavior. Technical report, The Brookings Institution.
- Van Ommeren, J. and Dargay, J. (2006). The Optimal Choice of Commuting Speed: Consequences for Commuting Time, Distance and Costs. *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy*, 40(2):279–296.